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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
EARL ALLEN v. STEPHEN L. HARDY ET AL. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
No. 85-6593. Decided June-, 1986 
PER CURIAM. 
In 1978, petitioner Earl Allen, a black man: was indicted 
for murdering his girlfriend and her brother. During selec-
tion of the petit jurors at petitioner's trial. the prosecutor 
exercised 9 of the State's 17 peremptory challenges to strike 
7 black and 2 Hispanic veniremen. Defense counsel moved 
to discharge the jury on the ground that the "'State's use of 
peremptory challenges undercut [petitioner's] right to an im-
partial jury selected from a cross-section of the community 
by systematically excluding minorities from the petit jury.· " 
People v. Allen . 96 Ill. App. 3d 871, 875, 422 N. E. 2d 100. 
104 (1981). The trial judge denied the motion. The jury 
convicted petitioner on both counts , and the judge sentenced 
him to two concurrent prison terms of from 100 to 300 years. 
On appeal, petitioner repeated his argument concerning 
the State's exercise of peremptory challenges. Relying on 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965). and on Illinois case 
law decided under Swain. the Illinois Appellate Court re-
jected the argument. The court reasoned that in the ab-
sence of a showing that prosecutors in the jurisdiction sys-
tematically were using their challenges to strike members of 
a particular racial group, "a prosecutor's motives may not be 
inquired into when he excludes members of that group from 
sitting on a particular case by the use of peremptory chal-
lenges." 96 Ill. App. 3d, at 875. 422 N. E . 2d. at 104. The 
record in this case did not establish systematic exclusion as 
required by Swain. /d., at 876, 422 N. E. 2d, at 10·t The 
court therefore affirmed petitioner's convictions. ld., at 
880, 422 N. E. 2d, at 107. 
• I - ~ ... 
' 
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Pl•titioner then fill•d a t>t:tillon for federal habeag corpus re-
lief in the Distr·ict Court for the Northem District of Illinois, 
on which he renewed his argument concerning the State's use 
of peremptory challenges. Com•truing this argument as al-
leging only that pro~ccutor~ in the jurisdiction systematically 
excluded minoritiel:> n·om juries, the District Court denied pe-
titioner's motion for discovery to support the claim, and de-
nied relief. Petitioner's failure at trial "to make even an 
offer of proof" to satisfy the evidentiary standard of Swain 
constituted a procedural default for which petitioner had of-
fered no excuse. 577 F. Supp. 984, 986 (ND Ill. 1984); see 
583 F. Supp. 562 (ND Ill. 1984). In a subsequent opinion, 
the District Court also considered and rejected petitioner's 
contention that the State's exercise of its peremptory chal-
lenges at his trial violated the Sixth Amendment. 586 F. 
Supp. 103, 104-106 (1984). Moreover, noting that the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had "twice within the past 
60 days reconfinned the continuing validity of Swain,'' the 
decision on which the orders in this case rested, the District 
Court declined to issue a certificate of probable cause. 
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. which the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit construed as an application for a 
certificate of probable cause to appeal. Finding that peti-
tioner failed to make a "substantial showing of the denial 
of a federal right'' or that the questions he sought to raise 
"deserve[ d) further proceedings," the court denied the re-
quest for a certificate of probable cause. 
In his petition for certiorari. petitioner argues that the 
Court of Appeals' refusal to issue a certificate of probable 
cause was erroneous in view of the fact that Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U. S. -- (1986), was pending before us at the 
time of the Court of Appeals' decision. The thrust of peti-
tioner's argument(;) is that the rule in Batson should be avail-
able to him as a ground for relief on remand. We conclude 
that our decision in Batsou should not be applied retroac-
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tively on collateral re\;ew of com;ctions that became final be-
fore our opinion was announced , and we therefore affirm. ' 
In deciding the extent to which a decision announcing a 
new co~titutionaJ rule of crimina] procedure should be given 
retroactive effect, the Court traditionally has weighed three 
factors. They are "'(a) the purpose to be served by the new 
standards, (b) the extent of the reliance bv law enforcement 
authorities on the old standards, and r c • the effect on the ad-
ministration of justice of a retroactive application of the new 
standards.'" Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638. 643 (1984) 
(quoting Stovall v. De1u'.o. 388 t:. S. 293. 297 (1967)): see 
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 t:. S. 618. 636 (19651. Wbile a de-
cision on retroacti\ity requires careful consideration of all 
three criteria, the Court has held that a decision announcing 
a new standard ''is almost automatically nonretroactive" 
where the decision "has e>.:plicitly overruled past precedent .. , 
Solem v. Stumes, supra. ~at 646, &H. The nile in 
Batson \'. Kentucky is an explicit and substantial break \\ith 
prior precedent. In Su:ain v. Alabama, the Court held that. 
although the use of peremptory challenges to strike black ju-
rors on account of race \iolated the Equal Protection Clause. 
a defendant could not establish such a violation solely on 
proof of the prosecutor's action at his 0'-'11 trial. 380 l". S .. 
at 220- 226. Batson overruled that portion of SU'ain. chang-
ing the standard for proving unconstitutional abuse of pe-
remptory challenges. Against that background. we consider 
whether the standard announced in Batson should be avail-
able on habeas re\iew of petitioner's murder convictions. 
The first factor concerns the purpose to be served by the 
new rule. Retroactive effect is "appropriate where a new 
constitutional pr inciple is designed to enhance the accuracy of 
criminal trials~· Solem v. Stumes. supra. at 643. but the 
'"By final we mean where the judgment of conviction Wa.E rendered. the 
availability of appeal exhausted. and the time for petition for certiorari had 
elapsed before our decision in'' Batson \'. Kentucky. Linkletter v. Walker. 
381 U. S. 618, 622, n. 5 (1965). 
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fact that a rule may have some impact on the accuracy of a 
trial does not compel a finding of retroactivity. /d., at 
643-645. Instead, the purpose to be served by the new 
standard weighs in favor of retroactivity where the standard 
"goes to the heart of the truthfinding function." I d., at 645. 
By serving a criminal defendant's interest in neutral jury se-
lection procedures, the rule in Batson plainly has some bear-
ing on the truthfinding function of a criminal trial. But the 
decision serves other values as well. Our holding ensures 
that States do not discriminate against citizens who are sum-
moned to sit in judgment against a member of their own race 
and strengthens public confidence in the administration of 
justice. The rule in Batson, therefore, was designed "to 
serve multiple ends," only the first of which has some impact 
on truthfinding. See Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U. S. 323, 
329 (1980); see also Tehan v. United States ex rei. Shott, 382 
U. S. 406, 414 (1966). Significantly, the new rule joins other 
procedures that protect a defendant's interest in a neutral 
factfinder. 2 Those other mechanisms existed prior to our 
decision in Batson, creating a high probability that the indi-
vidual jurors seated in a particular case were free from bias. 
Accordingly, we cannot say that the new rule has such a fun-
damental impact on the integrity of factfinding as to compel 
retroactive application. 
Moreover, the factors concerning reliance on the old rule 
and the effect of retroactive application on the administration 
of justice weigh heavily in favor of nonretroactive effect. As 
noted above, Batson not only overruled the evidentiary 
standard of Swain, it also announced a new standard that sig-
nificantly changes the burden of proof imposed on both de-
fendant and prosecutor. There is no question that prosecu-
:Voir dire examination is designed to identify veniremen who are 
biased so that those persons may be excused through challenges for cause. 
Moreover, the jury charge typically includes instructions emphasizing that 
the jurors must not rest their decision on any impermissible factor. such as 
passion or prejudice. 
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tors, trial judges, and appellate courts throughout our state 
and federal systems justifiably have relied on the standard of 
Swain. 3 Indeed, the decisions of the Illinois Appellate 
Court affirming petitioner's convictions and of the District 
Court denying habeas corpus relief clearly illustrate the reli-
ance lower courts placed on Swain. Under these circum-
stances, the reliance interest of law enforcement officials is 
"compelling" and supports a decision that the new rule should 
not be retroactive. Solem v. Stwn.es, supra, at 650. 
Similarly, retroactive application of the Batson rule on col-
lateral review of final convictions would seriously disrupt the 
administration of justice. Retroactive application would re-
quire trial courts to hold hearings, often years after the con-
viction became final, to determine whether the defendant's 
proof concerning the prosecutor's exercise of challenges es-
tablished ~prima facie case of discrimination. Where a 
defendant made out a prima facie case, the court then would 
be required to ask the prosecutor to explain his reasons for 
the challenges, a task that would be impossible in virtually 
every case since the prosecutor, relying on Swain, would 
have had no reason to think such an explanation would some-
day be necessary. Many final convictions therefore would be 
vacated, with retrial "hampered by problems of lost evi-
dence, faulty memory, and missing witnesses." Solem v. 
Stumes, supra, at 650; see also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 
U. S., at 637. 
Our weighing of the pertinent criteria compels the conclu-
sion that the rule in Batson should not be available to peti-
tioner on federal habeas corpus review of his convictions. 
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.~ 
Affinned. 
3 The substantial reliance by lower courts on the standard in S1~·ain has 
been fully documented elsewhere. See Batsou v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 
-, -. n. 1 (1986); McCray v. Abrams, 750 f. 2d 1113, 1120, n. 2 (CA2 
1984), cert. pending, No. 84-1426. 
~In his petition for certiorari, petitioner also argues that the District 
' . 
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Court erroneously denied him discovery on his claim that prosecutors sys-
tematically had excluded minorities from petit juries in the jurisdiction. 
In effect. the District Court held that, by making no offer of proof on this 
claim, petitioner's bare objection failed to preserve the claim for review. 
Since petitioner points to no Illinois authority casting doubt on the District 
Court's conclusion that, at the least, an offer of proof was necessary to pre-
serve the issue, we have no reason to question the District Court's conclu-
sion that the claim was waived. Similarly, the District Court properly de-
termined that petitioner was required to, and did not, establish cause and 
prejudice excusing his default. See Wainwright v. Sykes. 433 U. S. 72 
(1977). 
